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The Effects of Trust on Performance of High-Tech Business Relationships
ABSTRACT
We investigate the effects of trust propensity, cognition based trust and affect based
trust on relationship performance in terms of openness, conflicts and success. Data
from a field study of 391 Dutch firms in high tech industries support the research
model. Trust that derives from affection is key and outweighs cognition based trust
and trust propensity. Openness increases success that in turn fosters the development
of affect based trust. The results provide preliminary but convincing evidence for the
value of relational capital in durable business relationships that strive for the
development of new technological knowledge.
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1. INTRODUCTION
1
In recent decades interfirm collaboration increasingly has become important. This
particularly applies for the development of new knowledge in high tech industries.
Business relationships in these industries may offer substantial future benefits.
However, due to substantial dedicated investments that are needed to develop new
technologies, such interfirm relationships share risks as well. Firms need to craft
governance mechanisms to safeguard the risks. Achieving a greater understanding of
the link between potential future benefits and governance is therefore important for
firms who are, or soon going to be, involved in high tech collaborative efforts. In this
article, we examine how vulnerable firms use trust to manage the performance of their
business relationships.
Business relationships in high tech industries share three specific characteristics.
Firstly, the development of new technological knowledge is essentially different from
the development of new commodity products. New technological knowledge is a case
of intangible capital – no market and thus price mechanism for such capital exists.
Firms with complementary competencies have to develop new technological
knowledge themselves. This requires dedicated investments and a sufficiently durable
relationship to recoup these investments. It does not entail that relations should last
endlessly. Indeed, relations can become too durable, yielding rigidities and lack of
variety that is needed for learning.
Secondly, the development of new technological knowledge (innovation) requires
a combination of products, markets, technologies and organizational capabilities that
most companies do not have in-house and for which reason they have to cooperate
with complementary specialists (cf. Zagnoli and Cardini 1994). Open communication
and sharing of highly specialist knowledge is a necessary condition that needs to be
met otherwise new knowledge cannot be developed in the first place. Specialist
knowledge, however, often is strictly confidential because it is this type of knowledge
1 Hans van Ees has made valuable comments and suggestions for which the authors are
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that offers competitive advantages. Sharing of such knowledge shares risks of
spillover and loss of market shares particularly when the (potential) partner firm is a
(future) competitor. Firms have strong incentives to manage these risks of spill-over.
Thirdly, business relationships in high tech industries are often characterized by
much uncertainty and great interdependence. For that reason it is very difficult or even
impossible to write complete contingent contracts prior to the relationship. This
implies that many issues and unforeseen circumstances need to be managed during
the relationship. This is important because misunderstandings, conflicts, changing
expectations and conflicting interests among parties are inevitable in durable
relationships (Ring and Van de Ven 1994). Because none of the partners has formal
authority over the other, this may mean that collaborative firms rethink and
renegotiate contested issues during the relationship. The joint characteristics of
uncertainty with interdependence in combination with the complexity of the
innovation process make the management of high tech relationships challenging.
The impossibility to write complete contingent contracts – as well as to vertically
integrate – means that firms involved in high tech relationships need to rely on
alternative governance mechanisms. Recent studies on interorganizational exchange
candidate trust for this. It would be beneficial when a firm trusts the capabilities of a
partner to perform the negotiated tasks, as well as to trust its integrity to deal with the
shared information in such a way that it will not be misused. Various theoretical and
empirical studies have examined the role of trust in business relationships (see, for
example, the 1998 Academy of Management Review special issue, guest edited by
Rousseau et al., the 2001 Organization Studies special issue, guest edited by Bachman
et al., and the 2003 Organization Science special issue, guest edited by McEvily et
al.). A non-exhaustive list of interesting findings that derive from these studies is the
following. Trust increases commitment (Ganesan 1994, Garbarino and Johnson 1999,
Morgan and Hunt 1994) and the willingness to accept control by other parties (Martin
1991, Mønsted 1998); trust promotes openness (Sabel 1993) and increases the
efficiency of relationships (Bradach and Eccles 1989, Dyer and Chu 2003, Zaheer and
Venkatraman 1995); trust reduces the need for monitoring (Anderson and Narus 1990,4
Bradach and Eccles 1989, Nooteboom 1996) and vertical quasi-integration (Poppo and
Zenger 2002); trust decreases ex ante and ex post transaction costs (Dyer and Chu
2003, Gulati 1995, Larson 1992).
Despite an increasing consensus on the important role of trust in business
relationships, the concept itself is still suffering from a lack of conceptual clearness
and generic empirical support. Discussions on what trust is seldom distinguish well
between rational grounds of trust and emotional foundations. For example, game
theoretic interpretations often equate trust to prior successful relationships (Axelrod
1984). Here, trust is a rational extrapolation of behavior and competences ‘proven’ in
previous relationships. Others have argued that more or less formal institutions such
as contracts and legal systems form the basis for trust (Williamson 1993, Zucker
1986). In these cases, trust is a situation where the incentives and opportunities for
opportunism are cut off and hence leaves the actors little choice but to behave
trustworthy. In such situations, trust is both rational and calculative, and has become
impersonalized. The same can be argued for ‘social embeddedness’. Social
embeddedness can cut off paths for incentives and opportunities of opportunism
through mechanisms like reputation, family ties, exclusion and retaliation, and for that
reason leaves no other alternative than ‘to trust’.
The aforementioned sources of trust rely on a rational deliberation of the risk that
the other lacks competences or goodwill and/or of the risk for punishment (retaliation)
for oneself. Next to these rationalized approaches of trust we identify a group of
researchers who perceive trust to be ‘that something’ that cannot be grasped easily.
According to Bradach and Eccles (1989) and Lewis and Weigert (1985), for instance,
trust is a ‘cognitive leap’ beyond the expectations that reason and experience alone
would warrant. This conceptualization of trust differs from the rationalized
expectation approach (calculations, reasons, experiences). Trust in terms of ‘that
ungraspable something’ derives from a positive perspective of human behavior and
decision-making. Instead of reasoning that potential punishments reduce opportunities
for opportunism these scholars argue that it is because of an intrinsic motivation that
trust reduces opportunism. This intrinsic motivation follows from feelings of5
friendship, loyalty, care, concern and empathy (Chen 2000, Fehr et al. 2001, Lewicki
and Bunker 1996, Macaulay 1963, Macneil 1980, Maguire et al. 2001, McAllister
1995).
This paper empirically investigates the role of more rational and more emotional
forms of trust in high-tech business relationships. More in particular, we study
causalities between three different forms of trust and three different characteristics of
relationship performance, i.e. openness, conflicts and success. To the best of our
knowledge, this study is one of the few that simultaneously investigates causalities
between different forms of trust with different characteristics of relationship
performance. Hence, whereas some studies illuminate the concept of trust by
distinguishing between its constituent elements (Mayer et al. 1995, McAllister 1995,
Nooteboom 2002) and others examine effects of trust on performance (Anderson and
Narus 1990, Serva et al. 2003, Zaheer et al. 1998) the combination of both is rare in
particular for studies of business relationships in high-tech industries.
The outline of this paper is as follows. We further explore the concept of trust in
Section 2 and hypothesize the effects of trust on relationship performance in Section
3. In Section 4 we specify our research methods. The results of this study are reported




We first need to distinguish trust from its related concepts like risk, predictability and
vulnerability to arrive at a clear definition of trust. Trust is often related to risk but it is
not the same. Trust increases the willingness to become vulnerable, i.e. to take risk
(Mayer et al. 1995). This risk is a result of uncertainty with regard to potential
opportunism, relationship characteristics and contingencies. Trust is meaningless if
these risks were absent. When opportunism could be guaranteed to be absent and/or
when actors would be completely rational and fully informed, trust would not be
needed because all future circumstances could be predicted with great certainty. This6
also entails that trust is not equal to confidence or predictability. Whereas confidence
refers to a situation in which one does not have to consider alternatives, trust refers to
preferences for particular actions over others despite the possibility of being
disappointed (Luhmann 1988). This implies that in situations of trust, risks are
recognized and a conscious choice is made to take these risks (McAllister 1995). In
situations of confidence one would not have this choice and would simply accept all
risks.
Despite the fact that people choose to become vulnerable, this does not mean that
they solely do so because the other’s behavior is predictable. Deutsch (1973) argues
that trust goes beyond predictability since untrustworthy behavior can be just as
predictable. He concludes that trust is based on the expectation that one will find what
is expected rather than what is feared. In other words, it is not predictability but the
positive expectation that is distinguishing for trust. The concept of vulnerability is
central to this discussion. Trust alleviates the fear of vulnerability even when direct
control and monitoring is impossible (Gambetta 1988). Vulnerability therefore is also
considered a crucial characteristic for the definition of trust.
Domain specificity is a final distinguishing factor. Trust is directed to some
specific domain in which a partner is considered to be capable of exerting influence or
performing a certain task. Nooteboom (2002) has extended this aspect by
distinguishing between trust in competences (i.e., a partner’s capability to perform the
agreed upon task) and trust in intentions or goodwill (i.e., a partner’s good intentions
to do its best and to be loyal).
When the aforementioned characteristics are combined into one we arrive at the
following description of trust. Trust involves a conscious choice to be or to become
vulnerable. This choice is based on the positive expectation that another’s behavior will
not be detrimental to one’s own interests, irrespectively of the possibility to monitor or to
control this behavior. And trust is directed at a specific domain. In line with Mayer et al.
(1995) we adopt the following definition of trust: trust is the willingness of a party to be
or to become vulnerable to the actions of another party based on the expectation that the
other will perform a particular action important to the trustor, irrespectively of the ability
to directlymonitor or to control that other party.7
Sources of trust
Now that we have defined the concept of trust, it is still unclear on what basis one
trusts. Why is one willing to become vulnerable to the actions of another? How does
trust come into being? Is trust based on rational calculations, on feelings and/or
emotions or on a shared history of positive experiences? We hypothesize that partners
in a business relationship have three bases on which theytrust.
First, there is the propensity to trust. Trust always has an initial value and trust
propensity reflects the initial willingness to trust (Mayer et al. 1995). By definition,
some persons are more inclined to trust than others. Two opposite positions can be
distinguished: there are those who start with trust and only distrust when trust is
broken, and there are those who distrust until one has proven to be trustworthy. The
propensity to trust is a personality trait and is developed through education,
(inter)personal- and professional experiences. Also, it may be co-determined by
institutions such as nation-wide cultures, industries and/or social classes in which
actors are embedded. The initial level of trust can be considered as a given value
when people enter into business relationships. It is a predetermined and relatively
stable personality trait that is not likely to change over time.
Next, there is cognition based trust. Cognition based trust comes close to the game
theoretic interpretation of trust (Axelrod 1984). Because of its relevance to economic
transactions and its rationality, economists most commonly refer to this type of trust.
Cognition based trust predominately is based on knowledge of past behavior (Gulati
1995, Larson 1992, McAllister 1995, Zucker 1986). This knowledge provides an
expectation of future behavior via some form of rational extrapolation. This rational
extrapolation of past experiences into expected future behavior may involve goodwill
as well as competences because both can be identified in previous relationships.
Finally, there is affect based trust. Because of bounded rationality there always are
limits to knowledge. Therefore, business partners may also have to rely on their feelings
and/or intuition in deciding whom to trust or not to trust. McAllister (1995) concludes
that “behavior recognized as personally chosen rather than role prescribed, serving to
meet legitimate needs, and demonstrating interpersonal care and concern rather than8
enlightened self-interest may be critical for the development of affect based trust” (1925:
29). In other words, affect based is about liking and caring for each other. It is not
calculative but social. This does not mean that affect based trust is irrational. Norms of
social obligation and inclinations to feel responsible for another one’s well being can
form perfectly rational grounds to demonstrate certain behavior. Nevertheless, affect
based trust predominantlyis determined byfeelings and the impact of rationality, if any, is
limited.
Many studies mix rational with emotional sources of trust. This may cause a lack of
empirical support or conflicting results about the role of trust in business
relationships. Therefore we explicitly separate different sources of trust and
incorporate these in our research model. To be sure we want test this proposition with
the data in our sample. Hence we come to our first hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1. Trust can be distinguished into trust propensity,
cognition based trust and affect based trust.
3. TRUST AND RELATIONSHIP PERFORMANCE
Now that we have identified the different forms of trust, we will relate these to our
three dimensions of relationship performance, i.e. openness, conflicts and success. To
some extent, the available studies on trust guide us in developing hypotheses. Larson
(1992), for instance, indicates that prior exchange relationships and reputation (and
thus rational, cognition based trust) mainly play a role in the first stages of a
relationship, i.e. when partners are selected and initial agreements are established.
Zand (1972) studies effects of trust that comes close to our concept of affect based
trust. He argues that the key effect of trust is that parties become more open, accept
more influence and show less defensive behavior. Trust facilitates interpersonal
acceptance and openness of expression, whereas mistrust evokes interpersonal
rejection and arouses defensive behavior. Affect based trust would thus more likely
have an effect on relationship characteristics such as openness and conflicts. We use
these insights as point of departure to formulate the hypotheses that construct our9
research model.
Trust and openness
Effective communication is identified as a prerequisite condition for successful
relationships in general, and for inter-firm collaboration in particular (Anderson,
1990, Boersma 1999, Luo 2002). Communication facilitates the sharing of
information and to be effective, communication has to be clear and truthful. All
relevant information needs to be shared at all times even when it is difficult or painful
to do so. According to Zand (1972) persons who trust each other will provide relevant,
comprehensive, accurate, and timely information, and thereby contribute realistic data
for problem solving efforts. Hence we come to our second hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2. Trust propensity, cognition based trust and affect based
trust are positivelyrelated to openness.
Trust and conflicts
As argued before, high tech relationships are characterized by uncertainty and
interdependence and are hence difficult to safeguard by complete contracts prior to
the relationship. As a result, many issues will and need to be arranged during the
relationship. In an effective relationship, unforeseen circumstances will be dealt with
in a flexible and constructive manner. Changed circumstances, however, also may
lead to conflicts. Partners in business relationships have two options to respond to
conflicts (Helper 1987, Hirschman 1970). Either they can end the relationship (exit)
or they can try to solve the conflict (voice). In ‘exit’ situations, trust is often absent
and power used via e.g. legal enforcement of contracts. This may lead to increased
defensive behavior, more or deepened conflicts and an increased need for using
additional power to overcome this resistance (Deutsch 1973, Gaski 1984). According
to Sako and Helper (1998), ‘voice’ will be more likely in a situation where parties
trust each other. People who trust each other will expose themselves more easily, are
more receptive to suggestions of the partner, accept more interdependence, and have
less needs to control the other. Therefore, the likelihood of misinterpretation of each10
other’s behavior decreases. As a result, problems are more likely to be identified,
openly examined, and solutions are more likely to be appropriate and creative (Zand
1972). This enables an ‘open’ environment that fosters constructive cooperation.
Hence we come to our third hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3. Trust propensity, cognition based trust and affect based
trust are negativelyrelated to the level of destructive conflicts.
Conflicts, openness and success
In the introduction we posited trust to have a positive effect on relationship efficiency
and effectiveness due to increasing openness and decreasing levels of destructive
conflicts (Bradach and Eccles 1989, Dyer and Chu 2003, Zand 1972). Through
openness, problems can be timely signaled. This enables timely resolutions to
problems. Thereby, conflicts can be solved without harming the performance of the
relationship. The side effect of this is that that it deepens trust and fosters commitment
(Sabel 1993). Hence we come to our fourth hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4. Openness is positively related to success, while conflicts
are negatively related to success.
Feedback mechanisms
A limited number of studies have analyzed all stages of business relationships, i.e.
partner selection, initiation, development and termination (Gulati 1995, Ring and Van
de Ven 1994, Serva et al. 2003). These studies emphasize that interfirm collaboration
is a process in which feedback mechanisms play a crucial role. This particularly
applies for trust and the performance or success of a relationship. Ring and Van de
Ven (1994), for example, describe how performance and trust continuously are
evaluated against norms of fair dealing and efficiency. The more successful
relationships are, both in terms of performance and relationship quality, the more each
partner appreciates the other’s fairness, trustworthiness and competences. Hence,
feedback effects of success on trust are crucial and will continue until the relationship11
is terminated (Anderson and Narus 1990, Ganesan 1994, Martin 1991). It are these
dynamic mechanisms that explain the continuation of a business relationship. We
exclude the propensity to trust from feedback effects because trust propensity is
assumed a stable trait. Hence, we come to our final hypothesis:
Hypothesis 5. Success is positively related to cognition based trust and
affect based trust.
Control variables
Any model with a set of focused relationships requires that rival hypotheses be
discounted. We therefore incorporate four variables that are recognized as having an
influence on relationship performance, i.e. firm size, dependence, cultural congruence
and contract completeness. In our model we relate the control variables to the each of
the three dimensions of relationship performance.
Size. We include firm size as a variable in our model to control for extraneous factors
such as bargaining power and resource base. These factors may influence the
governance and performance of business relationships, i.e. co-determine openness,
conflicts and success. Large firms have the resources to make investments in the
development of new technological knowledge; they may be more successful in
directly extracting hostages than smaller firms and thus be less dependent on bilateral
governance mechanisms such as trust to protect their confidential, proprietary
knowledge.
Dependence. Resource dependence theory (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978) suggests that
the extent to which a firm is dependent on another firm influences the character of
interorganizational relationships and is thus likely to be influential in determining the
nature of governance mechanisms and performance as well. For example, a focal
firm’s dependence on the knowledge of a partner firm is likely to influence the focal
firm’s governance choices in the relationship. Also, a lack of dependence makes firms
less vulnerable for opportunistic behavior making both trust and contracts12
unnecessary or even meaningless. We therefore included dependence in the model to
examine the influence dependence has on performance over and above that
attributable to the level of trust in an exchange.
Cultural congruence. The more similar partners are in terms of culture, education,
gender or age, the more likely it is that the people will intuitively understand and trust
each other (Hellriegel et al. 1992). Identification goes even further: it entails that
people think and feel in the same way, sharing similar views of the world and norms
of behavior (Lewicki & Bunker 1996, McAllister 1995). This may lead to feelings of
friendship and that actors are not able, or not willing, to consider the possibility of
being untrustworthy herself, or the other to behave opportunistically. Generally, an
optimal fit between firms is considered to be a key explanatory variable for
organizational and relationship success (Balakrishnan and Koza 1993, Datta and Puia
1995, Shane 1992).
Contract completeness. There has been a long and vivid debate on the role of
contracts, trust, performance and the interrelatedness between these concepts. On the
one hand, contract theory argues that contracts form a rational basis for trust (Chen
2000, Lyons and Metha 1997, Williamson 1993, Zucker 1986). Efficient outcomes
(i.e., high performance and success) are the result of complete contracts. On the other
hand, social theory assumes a detrimental effect of contracts on trust because
contracts will increase defensive behavior; thereby increasing transaction costs and
decreasing the likeliness of successful outcomes (Dyer and Chu 2003, Goshal and
Moran 1996, Zand 1972). Whatever the outcome, contracts may be important in
business relationships that are initiated to develop new technological knowledge. Any
model that intends to analyze these relationships needs to account for contracts.
Our research model is represented in Figure 1. All notations in the figure follow the
standard conventions of structural equation modeling (Jöreskog and Sörbom, 1993).13
FIGURE 1
Research Model and Hypothesized Relationships
a
a Four control variables, size (ξ4), cultural congruence (ξ5), dependence (ξ6), and
contract completeness (ξ7), were modeled as distinct independent constructs but are
not shown individually in the diagram in the interests of presentation clarity.
4. METHODS
Research context
This study focuses on relationships between two or more firms and/or research institutes
that operate in high tech industries (biotechnology, new material development,
information technology, maritime technologies and environmental technology). The
lifecycle of R&D in these industries is very short. Much of the new technological

















































































































and/or services. Also, R&D activities require substantial investments almost impossible to
cover by an individual firm. Hence, particularly in the high tech industries we find much
collaborative efforts between (rival) firms. Uncertainty, interdependence and complexity
are some of the keycharacteristics of these relationships.
In the preparatory phase of the fieldwork, we conducted twenty-five semi-structured
interviews with consultants who had been involved in interfirm R&D projects in high
tech industries. This provided us with a wealth of information on the industries, interfirm
relationships and the development of new technological knowledge. We used this
information for the design of our research (design of the survey, respondents).
We collected field data by surveying companies that were involved in high tech
business relationships. The sample was a selected from 648 high tech projects listed in
the database of a Dutch subsidizing agency. Byfocusing on collaborative projects in high
tech sectors, we reduced the range of extraneous variations that might influence the
constructs of interest.
Measures
For nine of the ten constructs, measures validated in previous studies were adapted to the
context (an Appendix with the items and scales is available from the first author upon
request). We developed a new measure for the construct ‘contract completeness’. The
measure of contract completeness was developed using the knowledge and advice of a
legal expert on R&D agreements. This resulted in thirteen contractual clauses that
together comprise a complete contract for interfirm relations in high tech industries. We
used eight items to measure trust, the items were adapted from McAllister (1995) and
Nooteboom et al. (1997). We measured openness using three items adapted from
Anderson and Narus (1990) and Heide and John (1992). Conflict was measured by three
items adapted from Anderson and Narus (1990) such that not only the occurrence of
conflicts, but also the harmfulness of conflicts to the relationship was taken into account.
Success was measured by three items adapted from Anderson and Narus (1990). Size was
measured by a the number of employees and the annual turn-over of the focal firm. We
measured dependence using two items adapted from Nooteboom et al. (1997).15
Survey design and administration
The measures were field-tested in a sample of ten companies involved in joint R&D
projects. This resulted in a few adjustments to the questionnaire. A professional team
of a research company conducted telephone interviews with 572 business managers.
Prior to the interviews, we trained this team on peculiarities of R&D, high tech
industries and interfirm relationships. The average duration of an interview was two
hours. The team made three attempts to identify and interview the selected
respondents. The case firms were identified from a database on interfirm high
technology projects published by a Dutch subsidizing agency. The selected projects
were recently finished or close to the final stage. This procedure ensured that business
managers could easily be identified and were able to reflect on the performance of the
interfirm relationship. Since these managers take the lead in interfacing with partner
firms, they were deemed the most knowledgeable informants about the interfirm
relationships.
Response rate and non-response bias
We received 391 usable responses, giving us an effective response rate of 69 percent.
This rate is considerably higher than those observed in prior studies on interfirm
relationships (Anderson and Narus 1990, Poppo and Zenger 2002, Subramani and
Venkatraman 2003). We examined the possibility of nonresponse bias by asking
nonrespondents for their reason not to cooperate in the survey. The most common
reasons given, that the relevant manager was too busy, that the company’s policy was
to not respond to surveys or that they had recently cooperated in other surveys,
provided no evidence of a systematic nonresponse that would affect the results.
5. RESULTS
Descriptive statistics
We estimated the model using LISREL 8 (Jöreskog and Sörbom, 1993). This
approach allowed us to estimate the psychometric properties of measures, using the
measurement models, and the hypothesized interconstruct relationships, using the16
structural model.
The sample comprised 47 percent small size firms (i.e., less than 250 employees)
and 53 percent medium to large size firms (i.e., more than 250 employees).
Approximately 24 percent of all respondents worked for research institutes. All
respondents were business managers and directly responsible for the interfirm
collaboration. The interfirm relationships included projects in the fields of
biotechnology (15 percent), information technology (21 percent), environmental
technology (11 percent), new material development (25 percent), maritime
technologies (10 percent) and other high tech industries (18 percent). The means,
standard deviations, and zero-order correlations of constructs are in Table 1.
TABLE 1
Descriptive Statistics and Zero-Order Correlations
a
a n = 391
*p<. 05
** p < .01
C o n s t r u c t M e a n s . d . 123456789
1. Trust Propensity 7.87 2.40
2. Cognition Based Trust 11.17 3.98 --.01
3. Affect Based Trust 13.28 2.42 .14 ** .15 **
4. Openness 14,04 1.57 .13 ** .09 * .56 **
5. Conflict 4.50 2.46 --.14 ** --.15 ** --.75 ** --.50 **
6. Success 12.55 2.58 .16 ** .14 ** .55 ** .40 ** --.56 **
7. Size 6.71 2.29 --.12 * .03 .04 .05 --.03 --.03
8. Cultural Congruence 17.23 3.40 .15 ** .22 ** .71 ** .41 ** --.69 ** .48 ** .04
9. Contract Completeness 8.81 3.22 .09 * --.05 --.02 .09 * --.06 .06 .13 ** --.03
10. Dependence 5.16 2.70 --.10 * .03 --.06 --.09 * .09 * --.12 ** .01 --.01 --.15 **17
Measurement properties
We estimated the measurement models for both independent and dependent variables.
The constructs displayed statistically significant item loadings (t-values > 2) and
composite reliability above 0.6 (Bagozzi and Yi 1988). An Appendix with the
parameter estimates for the measurement models is available from the first author
upon request. The results for the measurement models are also used to test our first
hypothesis. Eight items were selected to measure trust. The exploratory factor analysis
(Table 2) results in three different dimensions.
TABLE 2
Factor Results for Trust
a









TR1 If the situation allows us to, our
company prefers to work alone.
-.02 .05 .88
TR2 In our company we have a culture
directed towards cooperation and
cooperative ties with external
partners.
.02 .08 .87
TR3 Our current relationship is a
continuation of a previous, long-term
relationship.
.91 .09 -.08
TR4 We only knew each other for a short
while but thought we could manage
the project together.
.87 .07 -.03
TR5 Before this project a friendly
relationship had already been
established.
.77 .02 .03
TR6 During the project, our partner
treated our problems constructively
and with care.
-.03 .86 .02
TR7 I have never had the feeling of being
misled.
-.06 .76 .18
TR8 We understood each other well and
quickly.
.20 .80 -.04
a Scale: 1 = “strongly disagree”; 3 = “neither agree nor disagree”; 5 = “strongly agree.”18
Based on the items we identified the first factor to measure cognition based trust; the
second factor to measure affect based trust; and the third factor to measure trust
propensity. The results from the confirmatory factor analysis also confirm the three-
folded classification of trust. Hypothesis 1 is thus fully supported.
Tests of the hypotheses
LISREL 8 results of the research model suggest acceptable model specification..
Values for the goodness-of-fit index (GFI) and the adjusted goodness-of-fit index
(AGFI) are 0.99 and 0.94, respectively. The value of the comparative fit index (CFI) is
0.99, and that of the non-normed fit index (NNFI) 0.95, suggesting that the data
support the research model. The value of the chi-square statistic is significant
indicating a less optimal fit (χ
2 = 10.78, p < 0.05). The root-mean-square error of
approximation (RMSEA) is 0.04; the 90 percent confidence interval for this estimate
is within the acceptable range and is lower than 0.05. Table 3 presents the fit
estimates for the research model as well as the parameter estimates for the structural
model. The findings from the tests of the remaining hypotheses follow.19
TABLE 3
Structural Parameters and Hypotheses
Path Hyp. Par. Stand.
Est.
t
Cognition Based Trust→ Openness 2 K11 .01 0.16
Cognition Based Trust→ Conflict 3 K21 ─.01 ─0.16
Trust Propensity → Openness 2 K12 .05 1.08
Trust Propensity → Conflict 3 K22 ─.01 ─0.26
Affect-Based Trust → Openness 2 K13 .51 8.34 **
Affect-Based Trust → Conflict 3 K23 ─.47 ─10.29 **
Openness → Success 4 B21 .09 1.81 *
Conflict → Success 4 B22 ─.29 ─4.41 **
Success → Cognition Based Trust 5 B13 .06 0.96
Success → Affect Based Trust 5 B23 .16 3.35 **
Size → Openness K14 .02 0.56
Size → Conflict K24 .01 0.44
Size → Success K34 ─.06 ─1.42 †
Cultural Congruence → Openness K15 .05 0.77
Cultural Congruence → Conflict K25 ─.36 ─7.88 **
Cultural Congruence → Success K35 .04 0.83
Dependence → Openness K16 ─.04 ─.96
Dependence → Conflict K26 .05 1.49 †
Dependence → Success K36 ─.08 ─1.85 **
Contract Completeness →
Openness
K17 .08 1.92 **
Contract Completeness → Conflict K27 ─.07 ─2.21 **










† p <. 1 0 ,*p < .05, ** p <. 0 120
Hypothesis 2. Like predicted, all forms of trust are positively related to openness.
While the path from affect-based trust to openness is significant (γ13 = 0.51, t =8 . 3 4 ,
p < 0.01), the paths from cognition based trust to openness (γ11 = 0.01, t = 0.16, n.s.)
and of trust propensity to openness (γ12 =0 . 0 5 ,t = 1.08, n.s.) are not significant.
Hypothesis 2 is thus partiallysupported.
Hypothesis 3. As predicted, all three dimensions of trust reduce the levels of
destructive conflicts. However, the path between cognition based trust and conflict is
not significant (γ21 = –0.01, t = –0.16, n.s.). The same yields for the path between trust
propensity and conflict (γ22 = –0.01, t = –0.26, n.s.). The path between affect based
trust and conflict is negative and significant (γ23 = –0.47, t = –10.29, p < 0.01.).
Hypothesis 3 is thus partiallysupported.
Hypothesis 4. The influence of openness on relationship success is positive and
significant (β21 = 0.09, t =1 . 8 1 ,p < 0.05). The effect of conflict on success is negative
and significant (β22 = –0.29, t = –4.41, p < 0.01). Both results align with the
predictions. Hypothesis 4 is thus fullysupported.
Hypothesis 5. Success is positively related to cognition based trust but not significant
(β13 = 0.06, t = 0.96, n.s.). The influence of success on affect-based trust is positive
and significant (β23 =0 . 1 6 ,t = 3.35, p < 0.01). Hypothesis 5 is thus partially
supported.
Overall, we have significant results for five of the ten paths that we tested in the
model. The results provide support for the role of different dimensions of trust on the
performance of business relationships in high tech industries. Affect based trust
emerged as more influential than cognition based trust and trust propensity.
Relationship success is fostered by openness whereas destructive conflicts diminish
success. The results also show that feedback mechanisms work from success to affect21
based trust but not from success to cognition based trust. We observed these results
after accounting for the influence of the relationship’s formal context (legal
arrangements operationalized by contract completeness) and controlling for size,
dependence and cultural congruence.
Control variables
The correlations for the control variables (Table 1) suggest that the larger firms in the
sample develop more complete contracts (R
2 =0 . 1 3 ,p < 0.01). Large firms, however,
are not more independent than small firms (R
2 = 0.01, n.s.). Nevertheless a more
complete contract does reduce interorganizational dependence (R
2 = –0.15, p < 0.01).
Cultural congruence between business partners appears to be a relative exogenous
parameter compared to others that co-determine the context of business relationships.
Size. Size is positivelyrelated to openness, but the relationship is not significant (γ14 =
0.02, t = 0.56, n.s.). The same yields for the effect of size on conflicts, it is positively
but non significantlyrelated to conflicts (γ24 =0 . 0 1 ,t = 0.44, n.s.). Size is significantly
and inversely related to success (γ23 = –0.06, t = –1.42, p < 0.10) although some care
needs to be taken because of the low level of significance. Apparently, large
organizations perceive business relations to be less successful.
Dependence. In the results shown in Table 2, dependence is not significantly related
to openness (γ16 = –0.04, t = –0.96, n.s.). Dependence is positively and significantly
related to conflict (γ26 =0 . 0 5 ,t =1 . 4 9 ,p < 0.10) and, in line with this, significantly
and inversely related to success (γ36 = 0.08, t = –1.85, p < 0.01). The negative sign
reflects the fact that higher dependence is linked to lower levels of perceived
relational success. These results are consistent with the expectation that a more
dependent firm will have a more vulnerable position in the relationship and
consequently an increased fear for opportunism. The hypothesized results were
increased defensive behavior and hence conflicts (e.g. Zand 1972). The positive
relationship with conflicts and the negative relationship with success, confirm these
expectations.22
Contract completeness. A more complete contract results in more openness, the path
between these two constructs is positive and significant (γ17 =0 . 0 8 ,t =1 . 9 2 ,p <
0.01). Contract completeness is significantly and inversely related to conflicts (γ27 =–
0.07, t = –2.21, p < 0.01). Contract completeness, however, has no significant
relationship with success (γ37 = 0.04, t = 0.83, n.s.). The latter does not support the
suggestion from contract theory that efficient outcomes are only possible when
contracts are fully specified or, in other words, that firms need to safeguard to the
maximum to be able to achieve successful relationships (Chen 2000, Lyons and
Mehta 1997, Williamson 1985). The results confirm the perception that contracts
form a basis on which parties can be open because spill-over risks are safeguarded
(Zucker 1986) while contradicting suggestions that extensive contracts lead to distrust
and conflicts, thereby harming openness and success (Bradach and Eccles 1989,
Goshall and Moran 1996).
Cultural congruence. Cultural congruence is positively related to openness, but the
relationships is not significant (γ15 = 0.05, t = 0.77, n.s.). The same yields for the
effect of cultural congruence on success, it is positively but not significantly related
(γ35 =0 . 0 4 ,t = 0.83, n.s.). Cultural congruence is significantly and inversely related to
conflicts (γ25 = –0.36, t = –7.88, p < 0.01). These results show that there is a direct
relationship between cultural congruence and the level of destructive conflicts –which
is consistent with the expectation– but that there is no direct relationship with
openness and success.
Comparing plausible alternative models
Tests of a hypothesized model can indicate either support or lack of support for it. The
explicit rejection of competing models strengthens the validity of hypothesized causal
relationships (Anderson and Gerbring 1988). Therefore, we developed a set of
plausible alternative models and compared them sequentially to the research model
using standard structural equation modeling procedures to examine the level of
support in the data for each (cf. Subramani and Venkatraman 2003). Table 4 reports23
results of these tests.
TABLE 4









2 10.78 (p < 0.05) 41.94 (p < 0.00) 45.38 (p < 0.00)
χ
2 31.16 34.60
GFI/AGFI .99/.95 .97/.21 .98/.82
CFI/NNFI .99/.95 .93/.55 .93/.60
RMSEA .04 .32 .13
Result Accepted Rejected Rejected
First, we tested a model that reflects the view that trust is completely irrelevant for
business relationships. To that end we removed all trust variables from the research
model. This alternative was rejected in favor of our research model. Second, we
considered an alternative model that allows for a limited role of trust. In this
alternative model we removed affect based trust but remained trust propensity and
cognition based trust. This alternative model was also rejected in favor of our research
model. The results of this sensitivity analysis supports the robustness of our research
model.
6. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Overall, our results are consistent with the theoretical predictions. This study extends
understandings of how vulnerable business partners, who typically do not have the
opportunity to extract safeguards for the dedicated investments and sharing of
knowledge ex ante, craft governance mechanisms that have the effect of safeguarding
them ex post, through joint decision making. Our findings are consistent with the24
logic of transaction cost theory, according to which relation specific assets in
exchange need safeguards because farsighted parties would not invest in such assets
otherwise (Williamson 1985). The following results are also worth highlighting. First,
we found strong support for our three-dimensional conceptualization of trust
comprising trust propensity, affect based trust and cognition based trust. This
confirms the categorization of trust suggested by Mayer et al. (1995) and McAllister
(1995). The three folded classification enables us to distinguish rational, calculative
motivations from intrinsic motivations to trust. The classification is a refinement of
the broader concept of ‘trust’. By doing so, it allows fine-grained empirical tests of
specific forms of trust on specific characteristics of relationship performance. Lack of
empirical support in studies that use a broad concept may be the result of the fact that
in a broad concept a host of different motivations and underlying reasons for firms to
trust are combined. Different motives may have different effects (positive, negative or
zero) and collectively outweigh each other. Our investigation shows a need to study
each form of trust independently.
Second, we found that the different dimensions of trust each have distinct effects
on relationship performance. It is interesting to find that both the propensity to trust
and cognition based trust do not positively relate to openness or conflicts. Especially
for cognition based trust this is remarkable because it seems to downsize game
theoretic arguments that frame prior relationships as a crucial condition for the
establishment of trust and success (Axelrod 1984). In high tech business relationships
the rational extrapolation of positive past experiences may only be important during
the first stage of the relationship when partners are selected and initial agreements are
developed. Our results suggest that partners with a shared history are not more
successful than those without past experience, nor do they have less conflicts or were
their relationships characterized by more openness. In general, the results highlight
the need for careful attention to the dimensionalization of trust in future studies.
Third, the results suggest that particularly affect-based trust decreases levels of
conflicts while at the same time it increases openness and success. Affect based trust
derives from intrinsic motivations. It is not rational in the sense that it is not based on
earlier experiences with the same partner in which trust already is proven. To the best25
of our knowledge, our results represent a first empirical demonstration of a value of
trust in business relationships being more influential on performance than trust
propensity or trust that is based on calculative grounds. This conclusion is also
supported by the fact that we observed the effects while controlling for dependence
and contracts. Dependence mayexplain success due to private ordering; contracts may
explain success due to legal ordering. It is our suggestion that intrinsic motivations to
trust enable ‘the leap’ beyond the expectations that reason and experience alone
would warrant’ (Bradach and Eccles 1989, Lewis and Weigert 1985). Hence, forms of
trust other than those that depart from rational expectations based on reason or
calculation (shadow of the future, contracts) or on experience (shadow of the past)
exist and add value to business relationships.
Fourth, we conclude that in our sample of high tech business relationships there is
no significant link between the level of detail of contracts and success. Furthermore,
we find that the level of detail of contracts is positively related to openness and
negatively to conflicts. These results go beyond recent suggestions that extensive
contracts harm relationships because they evoke conflicts and decrease relationship
quality (Goshall and Moran 1996, Lyons and Mehta 1997). Also, we find that success
positively feeds back to affect based trust. In other words, successful relationships
reinforce the positive feelings of trust, care and concern that business parties have.
Contrary to expectations, this positive feedback does not exist from success to
cognition-based trust.
Our study has several limitations. We collected data from business relationships in
high tech industries to enhance internal validity and control for important context
specific characteristics. This choice limits the generalizability of our results. Also, we
interviewed one respondent per interorganizational collaboration. Although our
respondents were the best-informed parties because they were the business manager
for the business relationship, it does mean that we miss other perceptions on the
relationship.
Our findings confirm earlier results. Nevertheless, it are the contradictory findings
that draw our attention. Questions that deserve future attention are: How is it possible26
that past experience does not increase openness and success? Why does affect based
trust have such strong positive effects on relationship performance? What explains the
limited role of cognition-based trust, trust propensityand detailed contracts on success
of vulnerable relationships that we study?
Existing literature on trust and the governance of transactions, preliminary departs
from the idea that vulnerabilities in a relationship should be safeguarded. Legal and
private ordering are the main governance mechanisms to achieve this goal. Trust,
conceptualized as an expectation based on e.g. earlier experiences, contracts, or
mutual interests, can provide complementary or substitute governance mechanisms.
However, there is increasing empirical evidence that firms often rely on rather ‘loose’
contracts and oral promises in stead of well designed governance structures (Bush and
Horstman 1992, Hart and Moore 1990). To the best of our knowledge, there is no
empirical evidence that these ‘loosely’ governed relationships are less successful than
‘better’ safeguarded ones.
To a large extent this still leaves the question of ‘the leap of faith’ in business
relationships unaddressed. Following the results of our study we suggest that intrinsic
motivations may provide an important explanatory factor for relationship
performance. Through openness, business partners are able to discuss a wide range of
issues – and by definition issues will arise in durable relationships. They also can
share ideas and feelings that foster foundations for creativity and inspiration through
which interfirm relationships achieve superior outcomes. These positive side-effects
of relationships governed by trust are not likely to be provoked by rational
extrapolations of positive past experiences nor by limiting opportunities for
opportunism due to detailed contracts (Dyer and Chu 2003). This also may explain
whyneither contracts nor cognition based trust contribute to relationship success.
The fact that no positive relationship was found between contract completeness
and relationship success, while contracts do contribute to openness and decreases
conflicts, suggests that contracts should not be considered as an uni-dimensional legal
document to safeguard relationships. In stead, contracts should be envisioned as
multi-dimensional agreements that can also signal trust and commitment between
business partners. This alternative interpretation of the role of contracts in business27
relationships explains that contracts maypositively influence performance.
To further explore these questions, future research should delve deeper into the
characteristics of trust that have no rational or calculative basis and examine the role
of this form of trust in interorganizational relationships. Recent developments in
experimental game theory provide convincing evidence that actors are more inclined
to behave trustworthy (i.e., grant benefits to the other, maximize joint benefits at the
cost of self-interest, refrain from opportunism at the cost of loosing own income) than
economists traditionally assume (Chen, 2000, Fehr et al. 2001, Fehr and Falk 2002).
This inclination to trustworthy behavior even holds in situations where players are
anonymous, i.e., where actors cannot be punished byreputation or bya ‘shadow of the
future’ (Belschak 2003, Camerer 2003). The implication is that people have an
intrinsic motivation to become friends, also with business partners. Factors such as
loyalty and inspiration form important motivations next to and on top of self-interest
and profit maximization. Although such factors may be less important for transactions
of (homogenous) commodity goods, they almost logically play an important role in
high-tech, innovative relationships in which people together create new ideas and
where creativity is not likely to be stimulated by lengthy contracts or rational
calculations.28
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